The bid / ask spread (inverse of liquidity) in turbulent financial markets-modeled theoretically-adjusts to market-makers' average costs. Market liquidity declines (spread increases) with increasing absolute value of market-makers' security inventories and volatility of security price and order flow.
in market liquidity with variation in market conditions. The bid / ask spread is presented as a proportion of the security's price. The bid / ask spread is the price of the market-maker's services; it adjusts in equilibrium as the result of the market-maker's optimizing behavior. The market-maker is characterized as a monopolistic competitor, a profit maximizer subject to an (average) zero-profit condition due to the threat of entry. The market-maker's cost is the opportunity (or borrowing) cost of his capital; his marginal cost is (weakly) increasing as his financial position is extended (an increasing long or short position), which is either financed by debt or by placing increasing equity at risk.
The principal result of this model is that the bid / ask spread is an increasing function of the size of the market-maker's net long or short position. The bigger the inventory of the market-maker, the higher will be his average cost of capital, and the wider will be the bid / ask spread. Hence, imbalance in the buy-sell mix of order flow is priced in the bid / ask spread. In the case of a capital market averse to the risk of possible market-maker insolvency, the market-maker faces increasing marginal cost in the form of an interest rate increasing in the size of his inventory position. Hence, increasing asset price risk and order flow volatility also increase the market-maker's average cost (by Jensen's inequality) and the equilibrium bid / ask spread.
A distinctive element of the treatment presented here is the simplicity of the market-maker's problem. He acts primarily as a reseller of a good subject to the risk of price variability. The model ignores issues of differential information (informed versus uninformed traders) taking them to be independent of the volume and volatility considerations (particularly for the market as a whole) that the present study emphasizes. The model also separates the problem of finding equilibrium market price from the problem of setting (percentage) bid / ask spread and focuses solely on the latter. The model provides a simple explanation for declining market liquidity during periods of price volatility 1 and of order flow imbalance (either for the market as a whole or for a single security). In this setting, the market-maker typically accumulates a large net position in the security he specializes in; the market-maker buys (sells) when the public sells (buys). The significantly increased security inventory position leads to increased average cost which is then priced in the bid / ask spread.
Modeling the market-maker
We consider the market-maker for a single security whose price at date t is denoted P , conceived as t the midpoint of bid and ask prices. The evolution of price over time is exogenous. The market-maker sets a symmetric proportional spread S (equal to half the bid / ask spread) at date t representing his The market-maker passively accepts all orders to buy and sell. His only strategic action is to adjust the spread S . Inventory (of the security he trades) enters his choices of S because the costs of t t carrying the inventory need to be covered by the revenues from making the market. The market-maker starts period t with a cash position M , carried over from the previous period. In t conducting business at date t, the market-maker incurs costs C . We denote the market-maker's net t asset value position (not his profit) at the start of date t as P . The value of the market-maker's t position at the beginning of t then is P 5 P N 1 M . At t 1 1, the value of the position is t t t t P 5 P N 1 M . The market-maker's cash position evolves as
There are two components in C , the cost of providing market-making services. One is the direct t11 cost of trading: order taking, execution, and record keeping. The other component is the cost of carrying an inventory of the security in which the market-maker trades. For simplicity the first component is ignored here; since we are interested in variation in the bid / ask spread and variation in 2 the market-makers' average costs, we ignore this portion of marginal cost (assumed to be constant).
Market-makers' pricing: a zero-profit condition
Without modeling explicitly the competitive structure of market-making, we assume a zero-profit condition. In the case of NASDAQ, this represents the outcome of ease of entry into market-making. On the NYSE, this may be taken to represent the notion of the cost of maintaining an orderly market-or a normative ceiling (not necessarily zero) on specialist profits. 3 The zero-profit condition implies
On average, the market-maker assumes no net position on the securities in which he is making a market; expected sales and purchases are on average equal. Assume the distribution of the volume of 2 buy and sell order to be the same, with mean V and variance s . Then
Now assume that the distribution of price and volume at t 1 1 are not correlated. Further, we assume a martingale condition, that the expected mean of the security price at t 1 1 is equal to the price at t. Then
Therefore, the zero-profit condition implies
At the market equilibrium, fulfilling a zero-profit condition, the markup spread (half the bid / ask spread) is
This expression is the cornerstone of this line of research. The market-maker adjusts the bid / ask spread at any moment to cover expected (variable average) costs at expected trading volume. The market-maker pursues expected average cost pricing in a variable stochastic environment.
The quadratic cost case and the linear absolute value cost case
In order to derive a prediction from the pricing model above, we must specify the form of the cost function C . How does the size of the market-maker's net position, in the security in which he t1 1 makes a market, affect his average costs? Holding the security inventory N requires financing, and t1 1 4 the average cost of capital may vary with the size of the market-maker's inventory position. When a market-maker relies on self-financing, the cost of carrying inventory is the opportunity cost of capital; a quadratic cost function can be interpreted as reflecting the market-maker's risk aversion. Alternatively, if the market-maker's capital is debt-financed, an increasing risk premium, represented as a quadratic cost function, may be added to interest rates on lending to a market-maker whose position is increasingly leveraged. Thus we suggest the specifications:
market-maker's exposure-embodied in the size of his inventory-expands, so does the bid / ask
In the linear absolute value cost case we find that the bid / ask spread varies directly with the extent of the market-maker's security inventory exposure to market risk. The bigger the market-maker's 7 position (in absolute value), the bigger is the spread.
While some of the empirical implications of this model are indistinguishable from other existing 8 models, such as that the bid / ask spread varies with the price volatility of the underlying security, other predictions are more novel. For example, this model suggests that even temporary imbalances in order flow are likely to lead to larger bid / ask spreads as they tend to increase both net security inventory positions of market-makers and the variance of order flow.
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The mean of the distribution is V and the variance is s /3. 0 v 6 Our setting thus leads to the conclusion that when the initial inventory position is large, the time series of inventory position has a unit root. In contrast, the typical models that allow market-maker to set bid and ask prices separately tend to predict inventory position is mean reverting. Empirical evidence provides indirect support that, at least for high volume stocks, inventory positions may be highly persistent (Hasbrouck and Sofianos, 1993) . 7 Allowing a correlation between volume and price distributions would strengthen the positive relation between the absolute inventory position and bid / ask spread. A sudden positive (negative) surge of inventory should signal negative (positive) price changes are more likely, which makes the existing inventory even more costly to the market maker.
8 See the references section for a representative list of relevant papers (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Garman, 1976; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Ho and Stoll, 1981; Madhavan, 2000; O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986; Stoll, 1978) .
Conclusion
A market-maker's expected average costs increase with the size (absolute value) of his inventory position; the cost of financing inventory increases with its size. Further, in the case where the market-maker faces increasing marginal financing cost, expected average costs increase with security price and order flow volatility. These costs, in equilibrium, must be covered out of the bid / ask spread. Consequently, the bid / ask spread varies directly with security price and order flow volatility and with the size of the market-maker's security inventory position. Since an increasingly turbulent asset market is characterized by imbalance of public buy and sell orders and by increasing price volatility, the model predicts and explains that such a market is likely to be accompanied by deterioration in market liquidity.
